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Abstract: API level vulnerabilities of hardware security modules represent a serious 
threat, thus, discovering and patching security holes in APIs are important.  In this 
paper, we argue and illustrate that the application of  formal verification methods is 
a promising approach for API analysis. In particular, we propose an API verification 
method based on process algebra. The proposed method seems to be extremely well-
suited for API analysis as it allows for the straightforward modelling of the API, the 
precise definition of the security requirements, and the rigorous verification of the 
security properties offered by the API.  
1.  Introduction 
Hardware Security Modules (HSM) are indispensable in many applications,  such as ATM
1 
networks, public key infrastructures, electronic ticketing in public transportation, electronic 
payment systems, and electronic commerce, in general. A HSM is a hardware device 
(including the firmware and software components) which has some tamper resistance 
properties, and it is used to store cryptographic keys and to perform various security-critical 
cryptographic operations (e.g., generation of digital signatures and PIN
2 codes). 
 
HSMs appeared in civilian applications starting from the late 1960s. At that time, driven by 
the explosion of the number of banking card forgery attacks, IBM (the main supplier of the 
computer systems of the banks) developed a system where the customer's PIN was computed 
from the account number placed on the card by encrypting it using a key called the PIN 
derivation key. Therefore, the protection of the PIN derivation key against both the bank 
employees and outside attackers became an importnat requirement. This led to the 
development of the IBM 3848 co-processor, which represenst the first generation of HSMs 
that were widely used in ATM networks later. Today, the application of HSMs is expanded, 
and besides the banking sector, they became widely used also in Public Key Infrastructures, in 
Automated Fare Collection systems, and generaly in electronic commerce.         
     
The primary goal of attacking a HSM is to extract the secret data stored in it. The long list of 
potential attacks [2] starts with invasive attacks where the attacker physically penetartes the 
HSM and gains access to its internal parts, and it continues with non-invasive side channel 
attacks where the operational environment of the HSM (e.g., its timing and power 
consumption) is observed or manipulated. These attacks can be very effective, but at the same 
time, they often require expensive equipments. Finally, HSMs can also be attacked through 
their APIs by exploiting some design weaknesses in the API's logic. Being fully software 
based, this kind of attacks is much less expensive than physical and side-channel attacks, and 
depending on the weaknesses that are exploited, it may have devastating effects. This means 
that attacking HSMs through their APIs has a potentially high risk.   
 
                                                 
1 Automatic Teller Machine 
2 Personal Identification Number Many API attacks have been found against several widely-used, commercially available   
HSMs, which otherwise provide very strong physical protection [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11]. Thus, 
discovering and patching security holes in APIs are required, ideally, still before the large-
scale deployment of the HSMs. At the same time, APIs used in practice are complex, 
containing  hundreds of functions, which renders their analysis difficult.      
 
One promising approach of API analysis is to apply some formal verification method used in 
software engineering [8, 9, 11, 12, 14, 16]. In  this  paper, we follow this approach, and 
propose an API verification method based on process algebra that seems to be extremely well-
suited for the formal modelling of security APIs, the precise definition of the security 
requirements, and the rigorous analysis of the provided security properties. In particular, the 
here-in introduced method is based on the spi-calculus [1], which was originally designed for 
analysing key exchange protocols. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first who use the 
spi-calculus for analysing security APIs.  
 
In the rest of the paper, we first introduce API attacks against the Visa Security Modul in 
Section 2 for illustration and motivation purposes. Similar attacks also work against other 
HSMs. The subtlety of these attacks motivate the formal API analysis method introduced in 
Section 4. Our method is based on the spi-calculus, which is breifly reviewed in Section 3.  
 
2.  An API attack against the VISA Security Module 
The primary function of the VISA Security Module (VSM) is to protect PINs transmitted over 
the ATM networks. VISA's goal in promoting this technology was to persuade member banks 
to connect their ATMs to VISA's network, so that a customer of one member bank could get 
cash from an ATM operated by another member bank. VISA wanted to minimize the loss that 
could be caused by dishonest or negligent employees at member banks. The goal was to 
ensure that no single employee of any bank in the network can learn the clear value of any 
customer's PIN. This means that PIN numbers should not simply be managed in the software 
running on the mainframes of the bank. Instead, PIN numbers are managed in a physically 
protected, tamper-resistant environment implemented by the VSM.  
 
Due to the limitations of its internal memory size, theVSM only stores the most important 
master keys inside the module; other keys are stored outside secured under the master keys. 
The key storage method of the VSM follows a hierarchical structure [3] illustrated in Figure 
1, which has the advantage of efficient key sharing. However, if a key at a top layer is 
compromised, every key below it in the hierarchy will be also compromised.  The VSM uses 
five different master keys to encrypt other keys according to their relevancy and roles.  The 
VSM supports nine key types to distinguish roles. As we can see, master keys are placed at 
the top layer of the hierarchy, and are illustrated as circles, and the nine key/data types are 
illustrated as rectangles at the lower layers. The keys that belong to a given layer and a given 
type are secured with the corresponding keys at the upper layers, except the master keys.  
 
The master key ZCMK (Zone Control Master Key) is used to encrypt ZCK (Zone Control 
Key) keys. ZCKs are keys to be shared with other banking networks, used to protect the 
exchange of working keys. Working Keys (WKs) are used to protect trial PINs that customers 
have entered while they travel through the network on the way to the bank for verification, 
and are not used for intra-bank communications. Working keys are stored outside encrypted 
with the Working Master Key (WMK). Terminal Communications keys (TCKs) are for 
protecting control information going to and from ATMs, compute MACs of messages exchanged between VSMs, and are secured with the Terminal Commucation Master Key 
(TCMK). The Terminal Master Key (TMK) and the PIN generation key (P) are very important  
keys and are considered as keys with the same relevancy. Thus, they are both encryted under 
master key MK, in other words, they are treated as the same key type. The TMK keys are 
shared between ATMs and used to protect all keys sent to an ATM. The PIN generation key is 
used to generate customer PINs, as we know . Finally, at the lowest layer we can find user 
data that are encrypted with the operational keys according to their type, where X{ } means 
that the user data is encrypted with a key of type X.   
 
 
Figure 1. The key hierarchy of the VISA Security Module (VSM) 
 
Before putting a new ATM in operation, the bank has to supply the ATM with every neces-
sary key. To do this, first, a fresh TMK key is shared with the new ATM. All other keys are 
protected with this TMK during transmission to the ATM.  
 
The generation of the  key TMK is as follow:  Function GenerateKeyShares of the VSM API 
is called by the Host:            
 
:" " Host VSM GenerateKeyShares →  
 
The VSM generates a key part  i TMK , and at the same time, it prints the key part to a secure 
printer to which only authorized persons have access: 
 
ec : VSM S urePrinter TMKi →  
 
Then, it returns the key part encrypted under the master key MK to the host.  
 
{ } : MK i VSM Host TMK →  
 
We assume that two key parts are required to construct the TMK. The key parts TMK1 and 
TMK2 printed by the secure printer are given to separate authorized couriers, who carry it to 
the new ATM and load it in. After receiving both parts of the key, the new ATM computes the TMK key with XORing the two key parts,  12 TMK TMK TMK =⊕. The same TMK  key is 
produced at the bank with the CombineKeyShares command:  
 
{ } { } 12 :" ", , MKM K Host VSM CombineKeyShares TMK TMK →  
{ } { } 12 : MKM K VSM Host TMK TMK TMK →⊕ =  
 
There exists an API attack that exploits the Terminal Master Key generation function above. 
Namely, instead of inputting { } 1 MK TMK  and  { } 2 MK TMK , the host (or a programmer at the 
host) calls Combine Key Shares with inputing twice the same key token{ } 1 MK TMK  (or 
{ } 2 MK TMK ).  
 
{ } { } 11 :" ", , MKM K Host VSM CombineKeyShares TMK TMK →  
{ } { } 11 : 0 MKM K VSM Host TMK TMK →⊕ =  
 
Thus, the programmer can achieve that the all zero key becomes the TMK. He can then 
exploit this to produce customer PINs, since the PIN derivation key (P) is protected with the 
TMK key during transmission to the ATM for PIN verification. In other workds, the 
programmer can now easily decrypts { }0 P  with the key 0, and obtains P in clear. With the 
key P, he can generate the PIN of any customer.      
 
There is an another attack that uses the EncryptCommsKey function of the API, which inputs 
a clear TCK key and returns the encrypted version under the master key TCMK. This key 
token is stored in an external storage.    
  
:" ", Host VSM EncryptCommsKey TCK →  
{ } : TCMK VSM Host TCK →  
 
As mentioned above, every key, including the TCK key, must be transferred to a new ATM. 
The transmission of the key TCK is also protected with the mastrer key TMK:  { }TMK TCK . The 
function  TranslateCommsKeytoTMK ensures  the generation of this key token: 
 
{ } { } :" ", ,
TCMK MK Host VSM TranslateCommsKeytoTMK TCK TMK →  
{ } : TMK VSM Host TCK →  
 
The attack exploits that TMK and P are treated as having the same type. The malicious 
programmer calls EncryptCommsKey, but instead of inputting TCK, he inputs the customer's 
account number PAN:  
 
:" ", Host VSM EncryptCommsKey PAN →  
{ } : TCMK VSM Host PAN →  
 
Next, he calls TranslateCommsKeytoTMK, but instead of inputting { }
TCMK TCK , he inputs the 
resulted key token { }TCMK PAN  of the previous step. Besides this, he inputs { }MK P  instead of 
{ }MK TMK . 
{ } { } :" ", ,
TCMK MK Host VSM TranslateCommsKeytoTMK PAN P →  { } :=     P VSM Host PAN PIN →  
 
The returned value is the account number PAN encrypted under the PIN derivation key, which 
is exactly the PIN number of the account holder. 
 
3.  Overview of the spi-calculus 
In this section, we give a brief overview of the spi-calculus [1], an extension of the π -
calculus [13] with cryptographic primitives. Similarly to the π -calculus, the spi-calculus can 
be seen as a programming language. Hence, the spi-calculus seems to be well-suited for 
modeling security APIs.  
Syntax of the spi-calculus 
In the spi-calculus, communication channels are represented with names. We assumme an 
infinite set of names. In addition, we assume an infinite set of variables that is important at 
initialization.  Let x, y, and z  range over variables, and let m, n, and c range over names. We 
distinguish terms and processes. Terms (messages, channel identification, keys, etc.) represent 
data, while processes describe behaviour. A term can be an atom, such as a constant or a 
variable, or it can be a complex term.  
 
The set of terms is defined by the following grammar: 
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As we can see, a term can be a name, a pair of terms, a constant zero, the successor of a given 
term, or a variable. We emphasize the term { } 12 , ,...,
N k MM M , which represents shared-key 
encryption, where N  represents the key, and  12 , ,..., k M MM  terms  represent the fields of the 
plaintext message.  
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The above constructions of the spi-calculus have the following intuitive meanings: 
 
•  Output : Here, the term M represents a channel. This process is ready to output terms 
12 , ,..., k NN N  on channel M. If a reaction step ( s e e  b e l o w )  c a n  o c c u r ,  t h e n  t e r m s  
12 , ,..., k NN N  are sent on channel  M  and  then process P runs. 
 
•  Input : This process is the pair of the ouput process. In a reaction step, an output 
process sends terms  12 , ,..., k NN N  as a message on channel M, and an input process 
inputs these terms from the same channel, and then process  1122 /, /,, / kk PN xN x N x     K  
runs, where  / Nx  represents the binding of variable x  to term N . More precisely, 
variables are substituted with the inputted terms in process P.  
 
•  Composition (P|Q):  This conctruction represents the parallel execution of processes P 
and Q. They can interact with each other via channels known to both, or they can 
interact with the outside world independently of each other. 
 
•  Restriction  ( ) vn P : The process P creates a new local name n. This name cannot 
appear in other processes unless it has been sent explicitly during some 
communications. With this construction, we can model the generation of a new secret 
key.  
 
•  Replication  (! )  P : This construction represents an infinite number of copies of process 
P  running in parallel. 
 
•  Match  [] ( )        Mi sN P : This process behaves as P provided that terms N  and M are the 
same; otherwise it is stuck, meaning that it does nothing.  
 
•  Nil process () 0  : The nil process does nothing. 
 
•  Pair splitting  ( ) ( ,     )   let x y M in P = : If  ( ) , M NL =  holds,  then process  [ ][ ] // PN x Ly 
will execute, otherwise the process will  stuck. 
 •  Integer case ( )  (     0 :   : ) case M of P suc x Q : This process behaves as P if term M is 0, and 
as  [ ] / QN x if  ( ) M suc N = . Otherwise, the process is stuck. 
 
•  Shared-key decryption: Process case L of {x1, x2, ..., xk}N  in P attempts to decrypt the 
term L with the key N. If L is a ciphertext of the form { } 12 , ,..., k N MM M , then the 
process will behave as P[M1/x1, ..., Mk/xk].  Otherwise, the process is stuck.  
 
As usual, there are some important assumptions made about cryptography and messages: 
•  The only way to decrypt an encrypted packet is to know the corresponding key. 
•  An encrypted packet does not reveal the key that was used to encrypt it. 
•  There is sufficient redundancy in messages so that the decryption algorithm can detect 
whether a ciphertext was encrypted with the expected key. 
•  The attacker cannot find out or generate any secret data of the protocol.  
 
Modeling secrecy property in the spi-calculus 
In the spi-calculus the attacker is an arbitrary  R process about which we assume only that at 
the beginning it does not have any secret data. The attacker process runs in parallel with the 
process that models the system, and they can interact (communicate) via public channels. The 
attacker attempts to obtain some secret data using only the information that he gets during the 
interaction.          
 
Secrecy, which is a basic security property in the spi-calculus, is based on the 
indistinguishability of processes. Namely, the system P keeps data M  secret, if for arbitrary  
data M’, the attacker process R cannot distinguish P(M) and P(M’).  
 
A formal definition of indistinguishability in the spi-calculus is given by using the notion of 
testing equivalence. To make this clear, first we introduce some additional notions:          
 
•  Free and bound variables: Variable  x is  bound in process P if process P contains  
an input subprocess  () mx (for arbitrary m). Variable  x is  free in process P if process 
P does not contain an input subprocess  () mx. Let  () fvP denote the set of free variables 
in P. 
 
•  Closed term/process : We say that a term or process is closed if it has no free 
variables. In the spi-calculus,  we assumed that the attacker process is closed. 
 
•  Reaction step: A reaction step arises from the interaction of an input process  () . mxQ  
and an output process  . mM P . During the interaction the output process sends term 
M via channel m, while the input process receives it on channel m, and binds variable 
x to the received term. Then process Q runs with this term. Formally, 
 
[] .|( ) . | / mM PmxQ PQM x →  
 
•  Barb exhibiting: Exhibiting a barb means that a process uses a given channel to send 
or receive messages. Barb exhibition is denoted by ↓ .  Exhibiting a barb is entirely 
independent from the content of the output or input messages. Barb exhibition is 
defined by the two axioms:  
•  Barb In –  If a process immediately uses channel m to receive data, then it 
exhibits the barb m, namely,  () . mxP m ↓ . 
•  Barb Out – If a process immediately uses channel m to send data, then it 
exhibits the barb m, namely,  . mM P m ↓ .  
 
•  Convergence: Convergence intuitívely means that a process does not definitely use a 
given channel immediately, but only after some reaction steps. Convergence is 
denoted by ⇓, and there are two related axioms: 
 
•  If a process exhibits a barb β , then  it will converge to  β . 
•  If a process P transforms to process Q  that exhibits barb β , then process P 
will converge to barb  β . 
 
Next, after introducing the required notions, we give a formal definition of testing 
equivalence. 
 
Definition (Testing equivalence): A test is a pair (,) R β , where  R  is an arbitrary closed 
process and  β  is a  barb (m or m). Testing equivalence holds between P and Q, written as  
P ≈ Q, if and only if  P ⊆ Q and Q ⊆ P holds, where P ⊆ Q holds if and only if (P|R)⇓β  
implies  (Q|R)⇓β  for any test (R, β). 
 
Intuitively, P ≈ Q means that the behaviors of the processes P and Q are indistinguishable for 
any external observer R. More precisely, P and Q may have different internal structure, but a 
third process R cannot distinguish running in parallel with P from running in parallel with Q.  
 
4.  Modeling security APIs in the spi-calculus 
Although the spi-calculus is designed for modelling key exchange protocols, we argue that it 
is also well-suited for modeling the interaction with a HSM via its API. This is because the 
interaction can be thought of as a set of two-party protocols, each describing an exchange of 
messages between the HSM and the user. We can model the entire API as the parallel 
composition of the replication of the processes that represent individual API function calls. 
We show an example in this section. 
 
For this purpose, we first define a simplified security API. We assume that the security 
module has a master key, denoted by MK , which is stored inside the module. In addition, we 
distinguish two types of keys: data encryption keys (denoted by  i K ), and key encryption keys 
(denoted by  j KEK ), to which we link the type indicator constants  DataKey and   KEKKey , 
respectively. Key tokens that contain a data encryption key i K  will carry a type indicator 
DataKey. Similarly, key tokens containing key encryption keys  j KEK  will carry  KEKKey  as a 
type indicator. We also tag encrypted data with the type indicator TData. In addition, we 
assume that the modul does not store  i K   and  j KEK   inside,  instead it exports them in 
encrypted forms  { } ,
MK i DataKey K  and { } ,
MK j KEKKey KEK  under the master key MK. 
 
Our example API consist of four functions: 
 •  data-encryption:  This function inputs some data Data and some key token 
{ } ,
MK i DataKey K . Then, it decrypts { } ,
MK i DataKey K  with the internally stored master 
key  MK , and checks its type. If the type is  DataKey, then it uses  i K  to encrypt Data. 
Finally, it outputs the cipher { } , Ki
TData Data . 
 
•  data-decryption:  This function inputs some encrypted data { } , Ki
TData Data  and 
some key token { } ,
MK i DataKey K . Then, it decrypts { } ,
MK i DataKey K  with the internally 
stored master key MK , and checks its type. If the type is  DataKey then it uses  i K  to 
decrypt the cipher { } , Ki
TData Data . Finally, it checks if the type is TData, and if so, 
then it outputs Data. 
 
•  data-key export: This function takes two key tokens, { } ,
MK i DataKey K  and 
{ } ,
MK j KEKKey KEK  as inputs. It decrypts both of them with the master key, and 
checks their types. If the types are  DataKey and  KEKKey  respectively, then it 
encrypts  () , i DataKey K  with  j KEK . It then outputs the key token { } ,
j KEK i DataKey K . 
This token will be sent to another modul that may import  key  i K . 
 
•  data-key import: This function takes two key tokens, { } ,
j KEK i DataKey K  and 
{ } ,
MK j KEKKey KEK  as inputs. It first decrypts { } ,
MK j KEKKey KEK  with the master key 
MK , and checks its type. Then it decrypts { } ,
j KEK i DataKey K  with  j KEK , and checks 
its type. Finally, if the types are correct, it encrypts ( ) , i DataKey K  with the master 
key, and outputs the key token { } ,
MK i DataKey K . 
 
We can model the API defined above with the spi-calculus as follow: Let 
ENC MODULE , 
DEC MODULE , 
EXP MODULE , 
IMP MODULE  denote the data-encryption, data-decryption, data-key 
export and data-key import processes. Each process receives data (e.g., input arguments) via 
channels. The names  exp p ,,, enc im dec cccc denote the communication channels through which 
the processes can receive data. Moreover, we define a channel  user c   through which the 
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Then, the API can be represented as the parallel composition of the replication of the above 
processes with an initial output of some key tokens. These key tokens are stored outside of the 







! ( )|! ( )|! ( )|! ( )






c DataKey K KEKKey KEK
vMK








It is possible to prove formally that this simplified API never leaks out keys in clear. In the 
formal proof we have to prove the following testing equivalences: SysAPI(Ki,  KEKj)  ≈ 
SysAPI(Ki’, KEKj) and SysAPI(Ki, KEKj) ≈ SysAPI(Ki, KEKj’), for every Ki, Ki’, KEKj, KEKj’. The 
proof of this is based on induction. We assume that at first, the attacker process R does not has 
any key, that is, the system is in safe state. Then, we prove that if the system is in safe state, it 
will remain in safe state after any reaction step between process R and the system. This means 
that the attacker cannot extract any key from the system via its API. We omit further details of 
the proof here due to space limitations; the interested reader, however, can find the entire 
proof in [15]. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
API attacks on hardware secutiy modules represent a serious risk. In this paper, we proposed a 
formal method for analysing security APIs. This method enables us to prove that an external 
attacker cannot extract any key from the modul via its API (given that indeed this is the case). 
A failed proof does not directly gives us an attack scenario, however, it often reveals the weak 
points of the API. The proposed method is based on the spi-calculus, which was originally 
designed for analysing key exchange protocols. In this paper, we showed that it can also be 
successfully used to analyise security APIs. Our experience shows that the spi-calculus is 
well-suited for this kind of analysis. 
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